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Abstract This article focuses on the Marxist characteristics of North Korea in its
interpretation of human rights. The author’s main argument is that many Marxist
features pre-existed in Korea. Complying with Marxist orthodoxy, North Korea is
fundamentally hostile to the notion of human rights in capitalist society, which existed in
the pre-modern Donghak (Eastern Learning) ideology. Rights are strictly contingent upon
one’s class status in North Korea. However, the peasants’ rebellion in pre-modern Korea
was based on class consciousness against the ruling class. The supremacy of collective
interests sees individual claims for human rights as selfish egoism, which was prevalent in
Confucian ethics. The prioritization of subsistence rights and material welfare over civil
and political rights was also the foremost important duty of the benevolent Confucian king.
Finally, unlike Marx’s reluctant use of the language of ‘duties’, rights are the offspring of
citizens’ duties in North Korean human rights discourse.
Introduction
The North Korean understanding of rights is composed of historically post-
colonial nationalist, politically Marxist and culturally indigenous ideas. This
paper deals with Marxist characteristics in North Korea’s interpretations of
human rights. Marx’s original ideas on rights were not initially much reflected in
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or ‘North Korea’). However,
the applied ideas and policy behaviour of rights and duties in real politics in
Stalin’s Russia and Mao’s China were largely transferred to the DPRK after the
formation of the country’s government in 1948.
When Marxist ideas first arrived in North Korea, they met other pre-existing
ideas. Many Marxist features such as collective rights and the primacy of socio-
economic rights and duties of citizens existed in the indigenous Korean philosophies,
namely, Choson Confucianism, Sirhak (Practical Learning) and Tonghak (Eastern
Learning). For this paper, I use ‘Choson Confucianism’ to refer to the dominant
governing philosophy, shared among the upper-class scholar-officials, yangban, in
the early to mid Choson dynasty (1392–1910). Sirhak was a subdivision of Choson
Confucianism in the 17th to 19th centuries; Sirhak scholars proposed limited
revolutionary ideas about social reform to abolish the hereditary slave system and
enhance commercial activities and the import of science and technology from China
and the West. Tonghak was created by a failed aristocrat named Choe Je-u in the
1860s and later developed in the form of nationwide peasants’ uprisings. Tonghak
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encompasses the most revolutionary ideas among all indigenous Korean cultural
traditions.
The Soviet influence was the first and single most powerful source for the
establishment of the DPRK’s laws and institutions on human rights at the end of
Japanese colonial rule in 1945. Between August 1945 and September 1948, Kim Il
Sung borrowed the Soviet system to build an independent state in North Korea. In
this revolutionary and transitional period, Soviet Marxism was intertwined with
the country’s strong post-colonial anti-Japanese sentiments to formulate the post-
war rights thinking in North Korea.
This paper analyses some of the Marxist features of human rights in the DPRK
and how they have been implemented in the country’s legal and political
practices. The Marxist influence has been slowly toned down since Kim Il Sung
established his own ideology called Juche (Self-Reliance) in the late 1950s and has
significantly withered away since his son, Kim Jong Il, reinforced Juche ideology
with ‘Our Style’ Socialism and ‘Our Style’ human rights after the end of the Cold
War. Marxism–Leninism was deleted from the DPRK’s 1992 Socialist Constitution
and finally communism from the amended Constitution in April 2009.
Korean communism under Japanese colonization (1910–1945)
and human rights
Shortly after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, two organizations of Korean
expatriates were formed in the hope of spearheading socialist revolutionary
movements in Korea (Choe et al 2000, 353). One was the Korean Socialist Party
(KSP) led by a well-known radical revolutionary, Yi Tong-hwi; it began in
Khabarovsk in June 1918. When Yi was named premier of the Korean Provisional
Government in Shanghai in 1919, many of his KSP members formed a communist
faction within it, the so-called ‘Shanghai Group’. In January 1921, Yi formally
adopted the name ‘Korean Communist Party’ (KCP) for the Shanghai Group,
which received the funding for anti-Japanese independence movements from
Moscow. The other organization, known as the ‘Irkutsk Group’, consisted mostly
of Korean e´migre´s in the Soviet Union (USSR). It began its existence as a Korean
section of the Irkutsk Communist Party, castigating the Shanghai group as
bourgeois nationalists feigning Marxist convictions in the hope of obtaining aid
from the Comintern.
There were early signs of human rights in the KCP’s political manifesto. A
large proportion of KCP slogans in 1925 included Soviet-style welfare rights as
well as nationalistic anti-Japanese clauses, including (Choe et al 2000, 358):
. establishment of an eight-hour labour law (a six-hour law for miners);
. establishment of a minimum wage, unemployment compensation and relief;
. establishment of a social security system;
. political, economic and social equality for women;
. payment of maternity benefits and the granting of a set period of rest with pay
prior to and after the birth of a child;
. compulsory education and vocational education for all at the government’s
expense;
. freedom of speech, press, assembly and association;
. abolition of colonial slave education;
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. compulsory elementary education;
. use of the Korean language in elementary schools, the replacement of
principals of elementary schools with Koreans, universities primarily for the
benefit of Koreans (the so-called ‘Korea for Koreans’);
. freedom of student association for high-school students.
As part of the anti-Japanese sentiments, these slogans included a provision for the
boycotting of Japanese goods. However, members of the KCP also warned against
the excessive nationalistic advocacy of Ch’ondogyo (an indigenous Korean
philosophy and religion created by Choe Je-u in the 1860s). KCP members noted
that ‘a great danger to the victory of the Korean revolution is the fact that the toiling
masses of the country still have illusions about Ch’ondogyo and other so-called
nationalistic organisations’ (Choe et al 2000, 359).
The North China Korean Independence League (hwabuk chosun dongnip
dongmaeng), which merged with the KCP in 1946, issued programmes and platforms
on 15 August 1942 (Choe et al 2000, 365) that were similar in nature to the KCP
slogans of 1925. The platform of the League included various democratic measures
and human rights as follows:
. establishment of a democratic government by popular election with all people
voting;
. freedom of speech, publication, assembly, organization, religion, thought and
occupation;
. establishment of a social system wherein the human rights of the people are
respected;
. the equality of the sexes in their livelihood, in society and in law;
. eight-hour labour laws and assurance of the rights of labourers in society;
. abolition of forced labour systems and miscellaneous taxes on the people and
the establishment of a uniform tax system;
. a compulsory education system supported by the state.
As we’ve seen, both the 1925 KCP slogans and the 1942 platform of the North
China Korean Independence League exhibited early communist forms of
guaranteeing human rights in Korea. These early ideas survived in DPRK’s
post-colonial Marxist context, as will be shown in the following sections.
The denial of human rights in capitalist society
Like Marx, the DPRK is fundamentally hostile to the notion of human rights used by
Western liberals under capitalism. Marx opposed the bourgeois concept of the rights
of man under an exploitative capitalist economic structure and insisted on abolishing
the system in order to emancipate working people fully. Similarly, the pattern of the
DPRK’s official discourse of human rights normally starts with a criticism of
capitalist society as follows: ‘capitalists talk about the rights of man, but there is no
right to work, no right to food, no right to medical treatment and no right to education
in capitalist countries’ (Kim Il Sung 1963/1982, 91)
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Human rights, ‘human rights protection’ and ‘human rights issues’
The DPRK’s hostility towards the notion of human rights in capitalist states is
apparent in its definitions of ‘human rights’ (ingwon), ‘human rights protection’
(ingwon boho) and ‘human rights issues’ (ingwon munje). The Dictionary of the Works
of Great Leader Kim Il Sung Suryong (Kwahak beakasajeoˇn Ch’ulp’ansa 1982)
broadly defines human rights as ‘political, economic, cultural and social rights
granted to citizens’. In keeping with Marx’s theory of historical materialism, it
starts with an idea that ‘concepts of human rights are different from one society to
another, depending on the class characteristics of a society and the state’s socio-
economic structure’. Secondly, the range of North Korean human rights is very
broad, covering almost every field of human rights: political, economic, cultural
and social. Thirdly, however, the wide range of human rights is unavoidably
ambiguous, providing no concrete human rights to any individual person in
society. Fourthly, only a person whose class status is justified as a member of the
working people can be a legitimate citizen and thus entitled to proper rights.
The regime shows an obvious hostility towards the idea of the ‘protection of
human rights’: this is defined as a ‘deceitful slogan aiming to destroy revolu-
tionary struggles and demean the superiority of the North Korean socialist
system’. It sees the language of human rights protection as mere political rhetoric
used by Western ‘imperialists’ and thereby as a ‘hypocritical manifestation of the
ruling bourgeoisie in a capitalist country’. The DPRK insists that capitalists
pretend to be interested in the human rights of the working class, but their real
purpose is to serve the interests of the bourgeoisie by taking advantage of the
working class by manipulating the concepts of human rights.
There has been a significant change in the DPRK’s perception on human rights
since the end of the Cold War. The 2004 International Law Dictionary (Sahoekwahak
ch’ulp’ansa 2004) develops a more articulated definition of human rights. It explains
the philosophical and institutional development of international human rights since
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. ‘Human rights issues’ are defined
as ‘those related to the protection and promotion of the fundamental rights of human
beings and to struggles against violations of rights’. Furthermore, human rights are
‘important issues with respect to human dignity, human values, and social status’.
The 2004 International Law Dictionary states that ‘international human rights treaties
have been adopted in order to protect human rights of all people and that these
include all rights related to the existence of human beings such as a right to
subsistence, a right to dignity, a right to free press, a right to work, a right to
preservation, a right to self-determination and a right to education, all of which are
inalienable and inviolable’ (Sahoekwahak ch’ulp’ansa 2004). The United States (US)
is depicted as a country using human rights rhetoric in order to attack and isolate
revolutionary and progressive governments from being members of international
society. The 2004 International Law Dictionary does not specify which countries the US
is criticizing, but from the political context it is apparent that the DPRK is one of them.
In the definition of human rights issues, the institutional development of
international human rights treaties is explained in an objective and neutral tone.
Again, the range of human rights is very broad although the primacy of economic
rights and collective rights, such as the right to subsistence and the right to self-
determination, are more prominent than other rights. In fact, the only political
right included is a right to a free press. The DPRK employs the naming and
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blaming strategy, accusing that the US interest in international human rights
institutions and treaties is only to serve, instrumentally, the interests of a few
capitalists and to isolate socialist countries. In doing so, the DPRK seems to believe
that ‘the best defence is a good offence’.
Human rights of capitalists and imperialists
The difference from Marx’s historical materialism is that, for the DPRK, it is not
only capitalists but also imperialists who cannot provide the basic conditions for
the protection of human rights. Although Kim Il Sung uses ‘imperialists’ and
‘capitalists’ almost interchangeably, the main reason for his criticism of the US is
its capitalist socio-economic structure (1977/1986, 532–534):
There is no democracy in capitalist countries. Countries without democracy cannot
protect human rights. In capitalist countries, the working People cannot be guaranteed
human dignity or political rights or even a right to subsistence. If there is any ‘human
right’ in capitalist countries, it would be a ‘human right’ to exploit, repress, and
disrespect the working masses by a handful of the privileged social stratum.
At other times, he criticizes the US for being ‘imperialists’ and for the ‘worst form
of social inequality and human rights violations’ taking place there and in its
‘puppet countries [i.e. South Korea]’. Kim (1977/1986, 532–534) said,
Imperialists deceive people by saying that they have ‘equality for everyone’ or
‘personal freedom,’ but they are all lies that can never come true . . . The democracy
defined by imperialists is a fake democracy and the ‘equality’ or ‘freedom’ they
praise is all camouflage in order to deceive the working People and hide the
inhumane origins of anti-revolutionary capitalism.
The conflation of ‘capitalists’ and ‘imperialists’ is not a random mistake. It is part
of the continuation of the post-colonial and post-revolutionary rhetoric used to
mobilize and unite people against foreign influence. In other words, the DPRK
authority used both anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist language so that it can
appeal to the working class and to bourgeois nationalists when necessary.
The repression over the anti-party movement
In practice, the DPRK’s denial of human rights was used to repress the domestic anti-
party (more accurately, anti-Kim-Il-Sung) movements in the 1950s. The anti-Kim
movements in North Korea were ignited by the 20th Party Congress of the
Communist Party of the USSR when Khrushchev denounced Stalin and initiated a
process of de-Stalinization in his ‘secret speech’ in 1956. Throughout the Soviet bloc in
Eastern Europe, domestic communist parties protested, there were campaigns
against the personality cults of their respective party leaders, and general secretaries
who modelled themselves after Stalin were subsequently deposed. For example, the
1956 Hungarian revolution was a spontaneous nationwide revolt against the Stalinist
government of Hungary and its Soviet-imposed policies.
The anti-Soviet and anti-Stalin international communist movements in the mid-
1950s influenced some North Korean communists. Some of the anti-Stalin political
slogans included, to a considerable degree, democratic principles and human rights.
They contained ‘equality before the law’ or the ‘protection of human rights’ and
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were soon espoused by anonymous Korean critics of Kim Il Sung’s Stalinistic rule.
The KWP was alarmed by this movement and immediately responded by declaring
that the party’s political aim was ‘to promote the rights of the working People
including workers and peasants’ (Kim Il Sung 1958/1981d, 208–210). The DPRK
claimed that ‘the political manifesto of the anti-Stalin movements that “the law
should be equal for everyone” was originally bourgeois propaganda that aimed to
deceive the working People’. Furthermore, to the DPRK, the main reason for what
were called ‘anti-party sectarian elements’ (bandang jongp’a punja) wanting to bring
back this bourgeois propaganda was the attempt to perpetuate the interests of
human rights violators (that is, the bourgeoisie) while hijacking the very concept
already grounded in its political and legal framework during the post-colonial
period of 1945–1948. Kim Il Sung (1958/1981d, 208–210) argued that the sectarian
argument against the party was ‘absolutely out of class interests and proletariat
dictatorship, aiming to protect the interests of landlords and capitalists’.
Kim Il Sung believed that the 1956 Hungarian revolution had diffused the
‘bourgeois’ idea of human rights into North Korea and agitated North Korean
‘revisionist sectarians’. Siding with the Soviet invasion of Hungary, Kim condemned
North Korean cabinet members and especially the members of the Ministry of Justice
for ‘abandoning the seriousness of revolution and giving up the inalienable fight
against anti-revolutionary forces in the guise of human rights protection’. The
background of the ‘revisionist sectarians’ that Kim (1957/1981a, 159) identified was
‘the imperial US that attempts to destroy socialist allies and the [South Korean]
Syngman Rhee administration that is increasing its military power to attack the
DPRK’. The ‘anti-party sectarian elements’ were criticized because they were
believed to ‘contaminate other ideologically-ill party members by spreading
revisionist internationalism disguised with the protection of human rights’.
The ‘August Incident’ ( p’arwoˆl chongp’a sakkoˆn) in 1956 was one of the few anti-
regime political coups against Kim Il Sung, little known to the outside world. Several
members of the Central Party Committee, the ‘Yanan’ and ‘Soviet’ factions, criticized
Kim Il Sung’s dictatorial leadership at a party plenum while Kim was away in
Moscow in the summer of 1956. The two groups accused Kim Il Sung of violating
human rights. The incident was indirectly influenced by Khrushchev’s denounce-
ment of Stalin’s personality cult and dictatorship, followed by other Eastern
European countries’ protests against their dictatorial political leaders. The anti-Kim-
Il-Sung forces criticized him for developing a personality cult and distorting the
‘Leninist principle of collective leadership’ (see more on this in Lankov [2002],
Scalapino and Lee [1972] and Suh 1967). Kim Hak-chul, a North Korean novelist in
northeast China, in his non-fiction political treatise entitled The Myth of the Twentieth
Century, denounced the destruction of democratic principles and ‘violations of
human rights’ resulting from the personality cult and dictatorship of Kim Il Sung in
the DPRK (Kim Kuan Woong 2008). The August Incident, however, ended up being a
total failure because of a strong defence from pro-Kim-Il-Sung factions; those who
criticized the regime were all purged or fled to China.
It is noteworthy that a human rights discourse did exist in the DPRK’s domestic
politics as displayed by the anti-regime factions in the 1950s. However, they were
completely rejected as ‘wrong-thinking’ capitalists and later all purged by Kim Il
Sung. Those whom Kim called ‘anti-party sectarians’ or ‘revisionists’ were criticized
for having been influenced by bourgeois ideas and consequently became subject to
purges. Since then, no visible anti-Kim faction has been reported outside the DPRK.
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Anti-capitalist education
Kim Il Sung paid particular attention to the class-conscious anti-capitalist education
designed for soldiers and workers. The idea of class struggle against capitalism is one
of the main themes in North Korean education. As you can see from the anti-US
posters reproduced in Figure 1, anti-capitalist propaganda has been an ongoing
subject in North Korean public discourse. Kim (1963/1982, 86–87) suggested that
people abhor the entire capitalist class, not just some individual landlords or
entrepreneurs, and should fight against the exploitative capitalist structure. He
constantly repeated the contrasting conditions of capitalist and socialist countries.
Although he admitted that North Koreans could not live as wealthily as landlords or
capitalists, he emphasized that they had no worries about food or clothes and could
work, study and receive proper medical treatment.
North Korean anti-capitalist education takes several forms. First of all, Kim
Chang Ryol, a North Korean human rights commentator (1990), argues
philosophically that the Western concept of human rights, when conceived in the
17th and 18th centuries, was nothing to do with ‘People’s sovereignty’, which he
believes holds the true meaning of human rights. He continues:
the protection of human rights was demonstrated by the bourgeoisie in their anti-
feudalist revolutionary movements. It did have a certain impetus to reform the
previous social structure. However, their slogans were devoid of truly meaningful
human rights such as the sovereign right of the People. Consequently, the bourgeois
‘Let’s Show the Rock of the People to
Imperialist Bastards’
‘Don’t Rampage, US Imperialists!’
‘Merciless Punishments for US Imperialists!’
Figure 1. Anti-US posters by North Korean artists
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idea of human rights has become absolutely irrelevant to the genuine protection of
human rights. (Kim Chang Ryol 1990, 92)
Second, Kim Il Sung has used a language of rights to criticize human rights
situations in capitalist countries. Whenever the DPRK is under attack because of its
bad human rights record, it responds with a long list of anecdotes about ethnic
North Koreans who have been discriminated against by the Japanese government
because of their ethnic origin and cultural heritage, the conditions of jobless and
part-time irregular workers resulting from financial crises and subsequent
structural adjustments in South Korea, and the racial discrimination and jobless or
homeless people in the US. Using rights language, the DPRK claims that ‘the right
to have decent living standards should be guaranteed to North Koreans in Japan.
The Japanese government must provide them with jobs, the right to return home to
North Korea and other democratic freedoms and rights’ (Kim Il Sung 1956/1980b,
374). The DPRK’s selection of extreme human rights violation cases in South Korea
is certainly exaggerated and highly selective. The statistics given below were
probably true in the early 1960s, but not since the 1970s when the South Korean
economy began to boom.
Today’s South Korea is in a state of absolute poverty, non-existence of rights, and is
full of colonial slaves . . . [it is] the land of darkness where all democratic freedoms
and rights are annihilated and the killing field of the People where terror and
slaughter are taking place every day. (Kim Il Sung 1961/1981a, 243)
In South Korea, an uncountable number of homeless people are holding empty cans in
the street, begging money and frozen or starving to death, eventually, somewhere
under nameless bridges. Many students do not have the chance to learn and some even
have to sell their blood to save money for their tuition fees. (Kim Il Sung 1963/1982, 89)
In Seoul, twenty per cent of the population eat only one meal a day and ten per cent
hardly eat. While the South Korean bourgeoisie waste food and drink every night, each
one drunk along with tens of prostitutes, the majority of people are starving all the
time. (Kim Il Sung 1975/1985, 216)
Thirdly, since the late 1980s, the anti-capitalist campaign patterns have been
slightly amended. The government has admitted that the country is not more
wealthy than most capitalist countries but instead has started emphasizing
‘the growing gap between rich and poor’ in capitalist countries (Kim Il Sung
1989–1990/1995, 393–395). The regime insisted that
It is true that the production levels of socialist countries are not higher than those of
capitalists. We can import capitalist technology but not the capitalist system. The high
technology in capitalist countries does not mean that their system is superior. (Kim Il
Sung 1988–1989/1995, 203–207)
—and continued to promote its own socialist system:
Our society’s democratic characteristics lie in the fact that everyone practices a
completely equal political right, enjoys sound and stable material and cultural life,
lead others based on like-minded love and faith, and strive for common interests
and collective betterment. (Kim Il Sung 1991–1992/1996, 51–52)
These rather defensive and solipsistic arguments partly came from the country’s
economic inferiority to capitalist South Korea. The leadership has also admitted
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several times that capitalist countries are economically more advanced than North
Korea. Still, the DPRK regime did not want to lose face and the logical conclusion was
to focus on those aspects of human rights which they thought capitalist countries
could not fully guarantee: especially a universal right to basic subsistence.
Ordinary North Koreans are taught by political propaganda that true protection
of human rights can only be fully achieved under North Korean socialist
democracy. According to a North Korean defector who was a teacher in a middle
school in 1995–1999, every morning North Korean schools begin with an ideology
lesson about ‘corrupt capitalist societies’ and the superiority of North Korean
socialism.1 However, due to the economic crisis in the mid-1990s, schools in North
Korea have not been able to function properly and have failed to provide a minimum
level of public education, including morning ideology lessons. More people realize
that the government cannot provide them with basic subsistence. According to recent
reports from Good Friends, a Seoul-based NGO working in the field of humanitarian
assistance to North Korea, ordinary North Koreans, especially women on street stalls,
are rapidly learning market principles as a matter of survival while the government
constantly but unsuccessfully tries to control capitalist elements.2
Socialist democracy: a prerequisite for human rights
Following Marx, the DPRK makes it explicit that socio-economic structure is the
most important factor for judging the true nature of a society. The DPRK
government perceives that a society’s socio-economic structure is not only an
important criterion to determine the nature of a society, but also a critical element
for the protection of human rights. It claims that socialist democracy is the perfect
system for that purpose. To Marx, having a system of human rights in post-
revolutionary society was only a transitional means to enhance people’s lives and
a system that would eventually disappear when communism was achieved.
However, to the DPRK, the protection of human rights is taken to be not only a
means of transition but also an end to be realized.
The government defined its own socialist system as ‘socialist democracy’
(sahoe chuuijok minju chuui), claiming that it is the most suitable for North Koreans.
According to Kim Il Sung (1977/1986, 532–534), democracy is
the politics that represent every demand from the masses of the working People. In
other words, democracy is a system under which a state establishes policies
according to the working People including workers and peasants, implements
policies according to People’s interests, and guarantees true freedom, rights, and
decent lives to the People.
Although the 1972 Socialist Constitution did not specifically codify class rights,
various statements by Kim Il Sung confirmed that North Korean rights thinking
was based on a Marxist class conception, which emphasized a socio-political
structure to guarantee all human rights under a proletariat dictatorship against
1 All interviews with North Korean defectors quoted here were confidentially recorded,
without full real names, for reasons of privacy and security. Interview with K00 on 5 November
2008, Seoul.
2 Reports can be found in Korean at ,http://www.goodfriends.or.kr/foodcrisis/nkt.
html. , accessed 9 November 2009.
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class enemies of the working people. Kim Il Sung (1977/1986, 532–534) defined
socialist democracy as a prerequisite for the protection of human rights, insisting
that socialist democracy was ‘the most supreme form of democracy that can only
provide true freedom and rights’.
Human rights contingent on a person’s class status
The second Marxist characteristic of human rights in the DPRK, as in other Marxist
states, is the conditionality of the entitlement to human rights upon a person’s class
status. In contrast to the established liberal position that perceives human rights as
the universal entitlement of all human beings, as derived from our innate moral value
or worth (Vlastos 1970), Marxist rights are contingent upon each person’s socio-
economic relationship to the means of production (Weatherley and Song 2008). In
practice, this has often meant that the bourgeoisie, who owned the means of
production under the pre-revolutionary order, are deprived of their rights in the post-
revolutionary state. Conversely, the proletariat, who were previously forced to sell
their means of production, are accorded the full range of rights. The idea of class
struggle against the bourgeoisie and the establishment of a dictatorship of the
proletariat impacted on the non-inclusive characteristics of human rights in the USSR
and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As a result, both the 1918 Constitution of
the USSR and the 1954 Constitution of the PRC restricted the rights of the bourgeois
‘exploiting’ classes.
The weak indication of Marxist class rights in constitutions
Notwithstanding the official establishment of the DRPK as a Marxist state on 9
September 1948, there was no distinction in the 1948 Constitution between classes,
and the same was also true of the 1972 Constitution, suggesting an absence of any
class conditions to the enjoyment of rights. Article 6 of the 1972 Constitution
appears to confirm this assumption by declaring the end of class struggle (kyekup
t’ujaeng) in North Korea: ‘in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, class
antagonism and all forms of exploitation and oppression of man by man have
been eliminated for good’. Logically and also according to Marx’s ideas on the
disappearance of the need of rights in communist society, it was not necessary to
use social class as a measure of who should or should not enjoy rights.
The national census: ‘three strata and fifty-one subcategories’
The first profiling of the entire domestic population took place in December 1958
to December 1960, through a series of ‘political examinations’ by the central party
in order to identify ‘impure elements’ in society (Ministry of Unification 2003,
327). Since then, there have been several national registration or renewal projects
(April 1966 to March 1967, April 1967 to June 1970, February 1972 to 1974,
January–December 1980, November 1983 to March 1984, October 1989 to
December 1990 and February 1998 to October 1998) (Centre for North Korean
Human Rights Studies [KINU] 2007b, 116). There were other investigative projects
to identify naturalized foreigners, South Korean defectors and Korean-Japanese in
1980–1981. The English version of KINU’s White Paper on North Korean Human
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Rights (2007a, 162) states that they were ‘family background investigation
projects’, which implies that DPRK’s national census is not particularly associated
with Marxist class perceptions.
Most significantly, the 1967–1970 classification project that divided the North
Korean population into three ‘classes’ (core, wavering and hostile) has received
particular attention from abroad.3 According to KINU (2006, 87–108), the ‘core
class’ is essentially the North Korean ruling class and comprises approximately 28
per cent of the population, including relatives of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il as
well as high- and mid-level cadres: they are described as ‘clean judicial cases’
(Kang 2007, 19–20). The ‘wavering class’ comprises about 45 per cent of the
population, made up of urban and rural workers who are not KWP members. The
‘hostile class’ comprises about 27 per cent of the population and consists of those
individuals deemed to be enemies of the KWP (Weatherley and Song 2008). They
include people who owned land or business prior to the establishment of the
DPRK, public officials who worked under the Japanese colonial government,
religious activists, persons of South Korean origin or family members of those
who fled to the South, family members of South Korean soldiers who were taken
prisoner during the Korean War and other ‘unreliables’ (see Hunter 1999, 3–11;
Kang 2007, 19). Members of the ‘hostile strata’ have limited access to the full
entitlement of human rights in such areas as education, employment, housing and
medical benefits, according to the KINU reports (2006, 87–108).
The hostile strata category did contain certain Marxist aspects of judging
people based on their property or land ownership. One of the clearest examples of
the class-based approach was Kim Il Sung’s accounts of alleged human rights
violations against political prisoners in North Korea. Kim (1977/1986, 535–537)
explained that the imprisonment and forced labour of political prisoners was ‘a
legitimate measure to protect the country’s democracy from its hostile and impure
elements who have abused democratic order and attempted to destroy our
socialist system’. He further stated that
Our communists are not hiding the Party’s identity or class-consciousness in
implementing democracy. Socialist democracy is not supra-class democracy that
can provide freedom and rights to hostile elements who oppose socialism or impure
elements who act against the interests of the People. The type of democracy which
can guarantee freedom and rights to the People, including workers, peasants, and
the working intelligentsia and at the same time which can punish a small number of
class enemies is the type of socialist democracy we have in our country. (Kim Il Sung
1977/1986, 536–537)
However, more importantly, those categorized as members of the ‘hostile class’
are invariably made so by reference to their family background or class origins in
keeping with the Maoist definition of the continuing class struggle even after the
overthrow of the bourgeoisie because of surviving capitalist elements within the
party and society, but in contrast to the conventional Marxist understanding of
3 Take note of the differences between ‘class’ and ‘stratum’. The national census actually
referred to ‘stratum’ (kyech’ung) instead of ‘class’ (kyekup): the latter implies the Marxist
notion of the revolutionary antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat
whereas the former simply distinguishes social status according to a person’s family
background, profession or loyalty to the party and the leader, as well as property ownership.
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class as relative to a person’s socio-economic relationship with the means of
production (Weatherley and Song 2008). For example, even though two gener-
ations have passed since the ‘socialist liberation’ of North Korea, an individual can
still be classified as a member of the ‘hostile class’ if his or her grandparents
owned land or business under the pre-socialist system or were in the government
during the Japanese colonial period. This method of determining class status
derives from a belief that class is a ‘state of mind’. The objective here has been to
cast the net wide enough to ensure that both actual and potential opponents of the
regime are identified and duly deprived of their rights.
Especially since the Cold War, the Marxist characteristic has become so minor
in determining the population’s class status that now most of the ‘core strata,’
especially those living in big cities, possess property and accumulate wealth.4
Since the end of the Cold War, the Marxist concept of class rights in the DPRK has
significantly weakened and been replaced by other categorizations such as a
person’s political beliefs or, more crudely, a person’s loyalty to the party and the
leader. Therefore, the ‘three classes’ and alleged discrimination by the DPRK
government, which it totally denies, are based on profiles of family backgrounds
and the current generation’s personal loyalty to the party’s hegemony and Kim’s
leadership. This perception of personal loyalty, with rights bestowed in return,
pre-existed in late Chosun Korean philosophy before the arrival of Marxism in
Korea. Confucianism focused on the hierarchical social order and subjects’ loyalty
to the king. Further traditional elements were added when the government
officially introduced Juche ideology and adjusted its interpretation of human
rights accordingly. In discovering a person’s ‘true’ class status, the KWP is seeking
to identify those who are loyal to the nation and the nation’s aims and objectives.
Only those who are deemed to be loyal to the nation are entitled to rights.
Collective interests over individual rights
The third Marxist feature in DPRK rights thinking is its prioritization of collective
interests over individual human rights. The collective nature of human beings as
‘species-beings’ or zoon politikon was emphasized by Marx. Therefore, the rights of
man or woman as an isolated and egoistic individual were denied whereas the
rights of the citizen were given room to some extent in the post-revolutionary
period. Both the 1977 USSR Constitution and the 1982 PRC Constitution state that
the exercising of freedom and rights must not infringe upon the interests of the
state, of society and of the collective.
The prioritization of collective interests over individual rights was also
desperately needed for the mass mobilization to build a new national economy in
the post-colonial context in the DPRK. More importantly, the implementation of
collective mentality over individual interests was not new to Korean people. It had
long been present in indigenous Korean philosophies before the introduction of
Marxism to Korea. Confucianism, being a role-based ethical system, had preached
an ideal of united and harmonious society.
4 Interviews with K00 and J00 on 18 November 2008 and 25 November 2008, Seoul.
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Collectivism and individualism
The DPRK’s preference for collectivism over individualism is clear in the
definitions of individualism and collectivism. According to the North Korean
Dictionary of the works of Great Leader Kim Il Sung Suryong (Kwahak beakasajeoˇn
ch’ulp’ansa 1982), individualism is
an ideology of the exploitative class who hope to live well only for themselves
regardless of others’ interests within society. Individualism is based on the
exploitative characteristic of capitalism . . . Individualism is the biggest obstacle for
a collective lifestyle and is the fundamental reason for all the rotten philosophies
such as liberalism, individual heroism, egoism, and ambition for individual fame
and success.
As seen above, individualism is equated with liberalism, capitalism and selfish
egoism, the biggest enemy of the communist lifestyle. Therefore, any claim for
individual rights might be not only against communism but also an unethical
social vice. Collectivism, on the other hand, aims
to prioritise collective interests over individual rights and to struggle for society, the
People, the Party and revolution. In other words, collectivism is a revolutionary idea
under the communist principle ‘one for all, all for one’, encouraging personal
attitudes to help and lead one another in society. Dictionary of the works of Great Leader
Kim Il Sung Suryong (Kwahak beakasajeoˇn ch’ulp’ansa 1982)
Collectivism is believed to be the ‘fundamental characteristic of the working class,
the basis of socialist and communist lifestyle for workers united and the principal
action for communists’. Collective interests come before individual human rights
under this social and political context.
The collective principle in the 1972 Constitution
The significance attached to collectivism and the rights of the collective is particularly
apparent in post-1948 DPRK constitutions. The DPRK’s propaganda for the
collective principle, ‘one for all, all for one’ (hananun chonch’erul wihayo, chonch’enun
hanarul wihayo), is prescribed in Article 49 of the 1972 Socialist Constitution (Article 63
of the amended constitutions in 1992 and 1998, respectively). The first DPRK
constitution of 1948, the so-called People’s Constitution, did not indicate this
collective spirit.
Article 68 of the 1972 Constitution stressed particularly that citizens should
enhance the collective spirit (chipdan chuui choˆngsin). It states that ‘citizens must
cherish their organizations and establish the revolutionary trait of working
devotedly for the sake of society and the People and for the interest of the
homeland and the revolution’ (Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea 1975, 21). Similarly, Article 82 of the amended 1992 Constitution
stresses that ‘collectivism [chipdan chuui ] is the basis for socialist lifestyle. Citizens
shall cherish their organisation and collective and work devotedly for the good of
society and the people.’5 Surprisingly, however, this collective principle
disappears in the amended 1998 Constitution.
5 The People’s Korea, ,http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/062nd_issue/98092413.htm. ,
accessed 10 April 2008.
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The collective interests of the family also feature strongly, the 1972 Constitution
and each of the 1992 and 1998 amended constitutions declaring that ‘the state pays
great attention to consolidating the family, the basic unit of social life’ (Articles 63, 77
and 78, respectively). Indeed the preface to the 1998 document lauds Kim Il Sung for
transforming the whole of North Korean society ‘into one big united family’.
In contrast to the Soviet and Chinese constitutional traditions, there is no explicit
provision in DPRK constitutions that nullifies an individual right if it is exercised in a
manner deemed to be harmful to the welfare of the collective (for example, state,
society and the nation).6 Notwithstanding this, the priority given to collective rights
in North Korean rights thinking is borne out by reference to the broad-based and
overriding nature of the provisions discussed above and also by reference to the
overriding principle of ‘one for all, all for one’ contained in all three post-1948 DPRK
constitutions.
Cooperative farms
In practice, the emergence of collectivism and the suppression of individual rights
in North Korea have been implemented through its collective management
system in agriculture and industry. There are other socialist collective manage-
ment mechanisms, such as the public distribution system, state ownership and
mass organizations, but this paper here introduces the cooperative farms, the
Tae’an Work System and the highly organized collective education and mass
games in the DPRK because they are the particular contexts in the Works of Kim Il
Sung where Kim stresses the need to repress individualism and promote
collectivism in relation to ‘human rights’.
As Marx was particularly critical of the right to private property, seeing it as
the right of egoistic individuals, Kim Il Sung was also cautious about widespread
individualism for private property among North Korean peasants in the late 1950s
and considered it the biggest obstacle to communist victory in the country (Kim Il
Sung 1958/1981b, 407–408). In remote agricultural areas, peasants were used to
possessing their own farming land and local officials and party cadres initially
had little experience in practising the newly adopted socialist cooperative
agricultural structure. The affluent peasants and blood-based tribal landlords who
had accumulated leadership and technical skills were in favour of individual
farming (Kim Seong-bo 1988, 338–340). Some peasants did not sell rice to state-
run public markets but instead piled it up in their private barns so that they could
sell it at a higher price when demand increased.
Kim tried to abolish this individualistic attitude among peasants. A nationwide
ideological education scheme was introduced as a means of eliminating this
‘bourgeois’ element among peasants. The situation was perceived by Kim as a battle
of ‘the new vs. the old’, ‘the progressive vs. the conservative’, ‘the active vs. the
passive’, ‘collectivism vs. individualism’ and ‘socialism vs. capitalism’ (Kim Il Sung
1958/1981c, 591–592). Accordingly, the government made a decision on collective
farming policy in August 1953 and finalized the scheme by 1958 via several steps.
6 Each of the three Soviet constitutions (1918, 1936 and 1977) and each of four PRC
constitutions (1954, 1975, 1978 and 1982) contained such a provision. For analysis of Soviet
constitutional rights see Unger (1981). For analysis of Chinese constitutional rights see
Nathan (1986).
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There was considerable resistance from affluent peasants or traditional landlords to
the socialist government’s agricultural policy. Rich peasants and local landlords
opposed the policy by collectively withdrawing from collective corporations, not
cooperating with the national plan of purchasing rice, slaughtering their own
livestock or conducting sabotage (Kim Seong-bo 1988, 322–323; Kim Yeon-chul
1996).
‘Profit-driven individualism’ among North Korean peasants was still a big
problem throughout the 1960s. Kim Il Sung introduced even tighter programmes in
the North Korean agricultural structure and state control mechanism, as well as
compulsory state ideology lessons by local councils. Kim Il Sung’s solution for the
party officials’ lack of ‘Marxism–Leninism and collective ethic’ was to place well-
trained central party officials, such as former revolutionary fighters , family members
of the People’s Army, or discharged soldiers, in local cooperative farms above the
peasant-based local party officials (Kim Seong-bo 1988, 342–343). In this way, local
officials were hierarchically under the strict control of selected appointees from the
central party. Under this new collective agricultural scheme, individual peasants
were no longer able to seek personal profit and were forced to learn the ‘Marxist
collective lifestyle’.
Tae’an Work System
The collective system was introduced not only in suburb farms but also in urban
workplaces in North Korea. The so-called ‘Tae’an Work System’ was provided as a
role model for collectivism in the workplace in 1961. The Tae’an Work System,
Kim Il Sung (1962/1982, 497) explained, would run in a collective way whereby
senior office workers ‘lead and help the work of junior labourers within the strong
fraternal comradeship under the collective principle of “one for all, all for one”’.
According to Hwang Jang-yup (2006), the high-level North Korean defector who
was international secretary of the KWP, the Tae’an Work System was named after
a city called Tae’an in South Pyong’an province. Kim Il Sung visited a power plant
in December 1961 and ordered a special instruction on how a ‘factory party
committee’ (kongjang dang wiwonhoe) should operate the factory’s work system.
Since then, Kim Il Sung’s collective methods to run factories have been called the
Tae’an Work System and implemented not only in factories but in every field of
industry, becoming the model management system for socialist society.
The Tae’an Work System was meant to check the bureaucratic practices of
factory managers through guaranteeing collective guidance by factory party
committees. In reality, the Tae’an model has systematically placed workers in a
collective work environment and prevented them from developing personal skills
or attitudes in a workplace constantly checked and evaluated by party secretaries
on the ‘factory party committee’. According to North Korean defectors who gave
their testimonies to Daily NK, a Seoul-based daily online newspaper on North
Korean affairs, the Tae’an Work System was welcomed by workers at the beginning
but has become a repressive totalitarian management system that is operated
predominantly by party cadres who heavily control workers and administrative
officials in factories, especially since the emergence of Kim Jong Il’s leadership (Lee
Joo-il 2003). Party secretaries control the supervision of all productive activities by
factory managers and engineers and even try to monitor their private lives. Party
secretaries often abuse their power to arrest people arbitrarily and send them to
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labour camps as scapegoats when their factories cannot reach a yearly target that
has been set too high by the party secretaries in order to demonstrate their loyalty
to Kim Jong Il. Daily NK reports that, sometimes, party secretaries persecute people
just because these people are not loyal enough to Kim Jong Il or simply because the
former have a personal grudge against the latter. The Tae’an Work System has
created enormous social conflict and tensions between party members and
administrators and significantly discouraged workers from developing individual
skills and talents, according to Daily NK (Lee Joo-il 2003).
Collective communist education and mass games
The collective spirit is particularly stressed in youth education. The party
instructed teachers in preschool and orphanages that they should teach children
to be selfless communists, full of collective spirit. Kim Il Sung (1961/1981b, 76–78)
emphasized that ‘the most important part of communist education is to teach our
children the spirit of love of the People, friends, affiliated organisations and
communities’. The ideal communist society depicted by Kim (1961/1981b, 76) was
one in which ‘people all work and live well together . . . have common interests
and aims to achieve and help one another closely in fraternal relation . . . like one
big family under the banner of “one for all, all for one”’. He asserted that selfish
ideas should not be endured in a communist society, and continued,
In order to be a communist, you should cherish your parents and siblings at home,
your teachers and peers at school, and your colleagues in the workplace. Those who
like playing alone and hate getting along with other friends are careless people and
they cannot be communists. In order to be a communist, you should care for the
interests of People first, not your own. You are often closer to your revolutionary
comrades than your family. Individual heroism brings individualism and dogmatism
and is a dangerous selfish idea of capitalists to harm collective unity and harmony in
communist society. In order to abolish this kind of ill-thought capitalist idea, everyone
should learn communist collectivism from a young age. From preschool, you should
learn that collective power is so enormous that it can solve almost every problem
beyond a level that one single individual cannot even imagine. (Kim Il Sung
1961/1981b, 77–78)
As part of collective school education, the DPRK introduced mass games to train
young children to have improved ‘organisational skill, discipline and collectivity’
(Kim Il Sung 1979/1987, 191). Mass games are a form of gymnastics in which tens of
thousands of performers take part in a highly regimented performance that
emphasizes themes of political propaganda and group dynamics rather than
individual prowess. Mass games are often accompanied by a background of
cardboard-turners occupying the seats on the opposite side from the audience. They
embody youth, strength, militarism and unity. Kim explained that the merit of mass
games is that the youth can build their physical strength, advance their artistic skills
and most importantly learn the party’s policies more effectively (see Figure 2).
Collectivism and labour mobilization
The main purpose of the government’s promotion of collective spirit was to mobilize
people’s labour power. Kim Il Sung (1954–1955/1980a, 264) stressed that ‘labour is
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the essential part of human lives’. Members of the party were told to prioritize the
interests of the party and society over their own. ‘Popular heroism’ (daejungjok
yong’ung chuui), which refers to altruistic heroes among ordinary workers, was
encouraged to help achieve better performance in daily economic and military
activities, whereas ‘individual heroism’ (kae’injok yong’ung chuui) was suppressed as
a form of selfish individualism (Kim Il Sung 1968/1983, 281). The Ch’ollima
movement,7 a state-sponsored movement in North Korea analogous to the Chinese
Great Leap Forward, also aimed to promote rapid economic development with
collective spirit.
The 1972 Socialist Constitution praises labour in a socialist country as ‘the most
divine and honourable activity’ (Article 2). It also states that labour should be the
Making of Kim Il Sung by tens of thousands
of flashcards
‘Hurray for the Revolutionary Ideals of Great
Leader Kim Il Sung!’
‘Revolutionary Military Spirit’ ‘Never Expect Any Change from Me!’
Figure 2. Mass games at the Arirang Festival in Pyongyang, 2000
Source: Yunkai, North Korea-Introduction, ,http://www.yunkai.de/stories/northkorea/
page5/northkorea5.html. .
7 The Ch’ollima movement is a long-term mass movement for enhancing rapid
economic construction and achieving socialism in North Korea. According to Kim Il Sung,
the Ch’ollima movement is ‘one of the communist ideological programmes to make people
actively participate in socialist construction and communist progressive movements to
make people achieve popular heroism for socialism’ (Kim Il Sung 1968/1983, 261). The
Ch’ollima movement was initiated by Kim Il Sung in December 1956. The slogan had a
mythical symbol ‘Ch’ollima’, which means a horse leaping 1,000-ri (approximately 250
miles): ‘Let us run with the spirit of riding Ch’ollima.’ It was jointly coordinated with the
Three Revolutions (Ideological, Technological and Cultural) that were also taking place in
order to improve the country’s material conditions. The movement has been
comprehensively implemented in almost every field: industry, agriculture, construction,
health, science and education since then, and still continues.
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workers’ collective activity for the common interest under the principle of ‘one for all,
all for one’ (Article 3). Working is both a duty and a right in the DPRK constitutions.
The 1972 Constitution claims that there are two ways of promoting collectivism in the
workplace: ‘team-based management system’ ( punjo kwallije) and ‘the premium
system’ ( jakoban wudeje) (Article 44), both of which are intended to encourage
workers’ labour and therefore increase the amount of national production and the
country’s material capacity.
The rationale behind the emphasis of collective spirit and selflessness was to
mobilize collective labour to build a strong state economy and military. It was also
to fight the bourgeoisie and imperial capitalists and achieve the dictatorship of the
proletariat. As briefly indicated earlier, these collective ideals already existed in
indigenous Korean thinking: they were seen particularly in the Confucian
emphasis on social harmony and the collective unity of society. Collective
measures like the land reform were already attempted by the late 19th-century
Tonghak followers, especially by poor peasants and other lower-class people. The
prioritization of collective interests over individual human rights has continued in
the public discourse of the DPRK to enhance the Juche leadership of Kim Il Sung
and to foster the ‘military-first politics’ of Kim Jong Il.
Primacy of socio-economic rights
The fourth Marxist characteristic in DPRK human rights thinking is its concern for
material conditions and stress on socio-economic rights. Marx’s historical
materialism shed some light on fundamental problems of the poor material
conditions of the working class and continued to provide an ideational foundation
for the primacy of socio-economic rights in Marxist states. Both the 1936 USSR
Constitution and the 1975 PRC Constitution included an extensive range of
welfare rights, including the right to work and rest, the right to education and the
rights of women. Like other Marxist states, the DPRK included a considerable list
of welfare rights in its constitutions.
However, the primary concern for people’s material well-being was the basic
qualification of a benevolent ruler in Confucian society and also the chief
motivation for reform-minded Sirhak scholars and Tonghak followers. One of the
most important duties of a ruler in traditional Confucian Korea was to take good
care of people’s basic subsistence and this is reflected also by the contemporary
right to subsistence, including the right to food, housing and health. The primary
concern with people’s economic conditions is not just a similarity between Sirhak
and Tonghak, on the one hand and Marxist ideas, on the other. Rather, North
Korean human rights thinking is better understood as a relapse of the state of
mind in the history of Korea, which can be traced further back before the arrival of
Marxism. Bruce Cumings would support this judgement: he insists that the
DPRK’s reigning ideology is closer to the country’s ‘neo-Confucian’ forbears than
to Marxism or communism.8
8 Cumings (2005). He confirms this argument at the talk at the London School of
Economics and Political Science on 23 October 2009.
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Welfare rights in the 1972 Socialist Constitution of the DPRK
Each of the four DPRK constitutions contains a wide range of welfare rights,
including the rights to work, rest, free medical care and education, as well as
certain welfare benefits enjoyed by mothers, although it is extremely questionable
whether such rights are provided in practice. The 1972 Constitution in particular
focuses on the ‘happy material and cultural lives’ of citizens of the DPRK as well
as their true democratic rights and freedoms (Article 50), which were newly
added to the ‘Socialist’ Constitution. This provision remains in the amended 1992
and 1998 constitutions (both in Article 64). The 1972 Constitution lists five general
welfare rights:
. the right to work (Article 56);
. the right to rest (Article 57);
. the right to free medical services (Article 58);
. the right to education (Article 59);
. and freedom to engage in scientific and artistic pursuits (Article 60).
The Constitution pays particular attention to revolutionaries and the families of
revolutionary soldiers and bestows special protection upon them (Article 61). It
also guarantees the equal rights of women and men (Article 62) and protection of
marriage and of the family (Article 63). Notably, the Constitution contains a
provision of legal protection for overseas Koreans (Article 65), which seemed to
cover Koreans with DPRK passports living in Japan.
Human rights in the 1971 Three Revolutions
The Three Revolutions in Ideology, Technology and Culture (sasang, kisul, munhwa,
samdae hyongmyong) contained Marxist features of promoting the labour rights of the
working class. On 24 June 1971, at the Sixth Party Convention, Kim Il Sung
(1971/1984, 207–208) announced that the Three Revolutions in Ideology, Technology
and Culture were not merely to pursue economic development but were to provide
decent lives for the people and to realize the ‘sovereignty’ of the working people in
North Korea. The Korean word for ‘sovereignty’ is chugwon, but a better English
translation might be the right to ‘self-determination’ (chagyolgwon). Kim explained
that:
The Three Revolutions in Ideology, Technology, and Culture are to make every
person in North Korea a Juche-style communist, to renovate the entire society into a
working-class society, demolishing differences in class, and to increase production
levels in order to realise ‘distribution according to his demand’. The Three
Revolutions are . . . the fundamental method of realising Jucheisation [Juche sasang
hwa] in society. (Kim Il Sung 1971/1984, 207–208)
The Three Revolutions are important in that they established North Korean rights
concepts in terms of the right to self-determination, labour rights and the right to
education. First, the Revolution in Ideology, according to the DPRK, was to realize
the right to self-determination. The DPRK believed that the ideology would make
society revolutionary and class conscious while the culture provided a higher
level of knowledge and skill (Kim Il Sung 1988–1989/1995, 203). Secondly, the
government said that the Revolution in Technology was launched in particular to
‘abolish the fundamental differences in labour conditions, permanently release
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people from hard labour and increase productivity’, that is, it was designed to
reduce the gap between hard labour and light labour and between agricultural
and industrial labour and to release women from the heavy burdens of house
chores (Kim Il Sung 1988–1989/1995, 204–205). Thirdly, the Revolution in Culture
was to end the cultural backwardness of North Korean workers, to provide
university-level education in culture and technology and to increase the level of
productive culture among North Koreans so that they could be independent and
creative social beings in society.
For the implementation of the Three Revolutions, the government launched
the Three Revolutions Team Movement (samdae hyongmyong socho’undong),
inaugurated in February 1973. Under this movement, which Kim Jong Il actively
led, the Three Revolutions teams were sent to factories, enterprises and rural and
fishing villages to implement Kim Il Sung’s ‘on-the-spot’ guidance in close
consultation with local personnel. Kim Jong Il was able to use this opportunity to
show his leadership in looking after the country’s economy as well as people’s
material conditions.
National economic plans and ‘happy material lives’
The DPRK has produced several national economic plans along with other
national programmes. Since 1956, the DPRK has pursued several national
campaigns for rapid economic advancement: the first five-year national economic
plan in 1957–1961; the Ch’ollima movement in 1958; the Ch’ongsanni spirit and
the Ch’ongsanni method9 in 1960; the first seven-year national economic plan in
1961–1967; and the Tae’an Work System in 1961.
According to Kim Il Sung, these were to fulfil people’s needs for subsistence by
‘creatively applying Marxism–Leninism’ (Kim Il Sung 1956/1980a, 42). Although
the organizing principle for national economic plans was, officially, Marxism, it was a
continuum of ideas for caring for people’s material conditions more than anything
else, deriving from Confucian rulers’ fundamental duties, Sirhak’s reform-minded
practical thinking, Tonghak’s radical rebellions, to post-colonial efforts to rebuild the
nation after the end of Japanese colonization.
Endless government rhetoric and propaganda have been put out along with
national economic plans for the improvement of people’s material conditions, all
employing a language of rights. This government propaganda includes:
The struggle for socialism is to make the People in the DPRK work fewer hours and
produce more output so that they can live prosperous and happy lives. (Kim Il Sung
1957/1981b, 38)
We have very strong foundations to live well and this is the inalienable right of all.
(Kim Il Sung 1962/1982, 513)
9 Ch’ongsanni is a small village in South Pyong’an province where North Korea’s
agricultural policy in the late 1940s was successful after the Land Reform. According to Kim
Il Sung, there were only 120 houses in Ch’ongsanni but 40 of them were receiving
newspapers and everyone who was of school age was going to school. Furthermore, almost
every house owned livestock such as cows, pigs or chickens, and no one starved even at the
hardest time of the year, which was usually June. The ‘Ch’ongsanni method’ refers to the
ways people live in Ch’ongsanni.
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All political rights, freedom and happy material cultural lives are guaranteed in the
DPRK. Equal rights are protected to the People, including workers and peasants.
Rights to food and clothes are guaranteed by the state and society, as well as eleven
years of free education and free medical treatment. (Kim Il Sung 1983–1984/1992,
155)
Our socialist system is the most supreme form of socialism that guarantees political
freedom, democratic rights, and happy material and cultural lives for all. (Kim Il
Sung 1986–1987/1994, 215)
As briefly demonstrated earlier, government’s primary concern with people’s
material well-being and the nation’s economic development pre-existed in
indigenous Korean philosophy. Korean Confucianism focused on the role of a
benevolent ruler to protect the people’s welfare and security. Reform-minded
Sirhak scholars stressed the importance of commerce and the development of
technology to enhance people’s lives. This practical thinking cannot be found in
conventional Marxism. The DPRK government, for example, has allowed limited
market activities since July 2002 and made ‘tactical concessions’ from a total
‘denial stage’, to cooperate with the international society, to borrow terms from the
five-spiral theory of Risse et al (1999). The government has submitted periodic
state – party reports to the United Nations (UN), invited international
humanitarian NGOs and UN officials to work inside the country, amended the
Criminal Law and enacted new laws in accordance with human rights norms. The
idea of self-defence and independence from China was a core part of Sirhak
philosophy as well.
Tonghak was born out of fundamental concerns for poor and lower-class people
in pre-modern Korea. Tonghak peasants’ movements, in particular, had the ultimate
goals of achieving social justice, gender equality, land reform and total abolition of
slavery. Their method for realizing these aims was revolution. Tonghak also had very
strong anti-foreign and especially anti-Japanese sentiments, which continued
through the anti-Japanese militant guerrilla movements during the colonial period.
Marxist materialism and its revolutionary means to achieve the dictatorship of the
proletariat were nothing new to Koreans as the DPRK government has translated
Marxism within the Tonghak ideas.
Citizens’ duties
The fifth and final Marxist characteristic of the DPRK’s rights concepts is the
primacy of citizens’ duties in return for the guaranteeing of rights by the
government. The DPRK emphasized the duties of different groups of people far
more than their rights. The duty of youth, for example, is to learn new skills and
technology (Kim Il Sung 1958/1981a, 194), rather than speaking in terms of a right
of youth to education. The primacy of duties is one of the most significant features
in Marxist states. Both the 1936/1977 USSR Constitutions and the 1975/1982 PRC
Constitutions list a number of citizens’ duties, the fulfilment of which is invariably
seen as a precondition for the entitlement of rights.
Duties as the offspring of rights are not a uniquely Marxist characteristic. The
idea of citizens’ duties existed within the framework of Hobbes’ and Locke’s social
contract theories and within the contemporary legal requirement for citizenship.
Citizens’ duties had long been emphasized in Confucian culture. Confucian ethics, a
How communist is North Korea? 581
role-based normative system, stresses everyone’s duties and responsibilities towards
one another in their complex web of social relations. Marxist states’ emphasis on
citizens’ duties came, therefore, very naturally to Korean people. North Korea’s stress
on citizens’, women’s or children’s’ duties under Kim Il Sung’s Juche is better
understood in this long historical and cultural Confucian context rather than just in
terms of Marxist influence. Kim Jong Il’s formation of the duty-based language of
rights is more intriguing. Kim Jong Il (1994; Ryom 1991, 56–59) prefers duty-related
language both as an offspring of human rights and a correlative term of rights.
Duties in the 1972 Socialist Constitution of the DPRK
As the constitutional basis for the primacy of duties, the DPRK set out the provisions
on rights and duties of citizens which are distinctively pronounced in the
constitutions. The purpose of imposing the duties of citizens, stated in the 1972
Socialist Constitution, ‘is to reinforce socialism and make the country richer and
stronger’ (Kim Il Sung 1972/1984, 608). Eighteen articles are allocated to rights
(Articles 49–66) and six to duties (Articles 67–72). Details of the duties are as follows:
. abiding by the Constitution and socialist principles (Article 67);
. respect for collective spirit, sacrifice for the interests of the People, the
Fatherland and revolution (Article 68);
. labour as the divine duty (Article 69);
. the preservation of public assets (Article 70);
. a revolutionary spirit and protection of national secrets (Article 71);
. and defence of the Fatherland and duty to do military service/punishment for
treason against the Fatherland and the People (Article 72).
Article 72 particularly emphasizes that citizens should defend the Fatherland and
serve in the army and that betrayal of the country is the biggest crime.
Chapter Vof the 1992 amended Constitution of the DPRK also allocates a section
to the rights and duties of citizens. Again, 18 articles are allocated to rights (Articles
62–79) and seven to duties (Articles 80–86). The duty to protect the unity and
solidarity of the People (Article 80) was newly added and the duty for national
security (Article 85) replaced the duty to keep national secrets, which was Article 71
of the 1972 Constitution.
Duties of ‘communist mothers’
Duties of women are particularly emphasized in the DPRK’s public discourse. The
stress on duties of ‘communist mothers’ (there are no specific father’s duties) is an
interesting example of the mixture of Marxist and Confucian notions of citizens’
duties. No other socialist states particularly focused on the special roles of
‘communist mothers’. The role of ‘communist mothers’ is described as teaching
children to have collective identities and not to pursue individual interests:
‘whoever abandons selfishness and follows the party line can be a communist
mother or father’ (Kim Il Sung 1961/1981c, 344–345). In 1961, Kim Il Sung named
Mun Jong Suk a role model for selfless communist mothers. Mun was a single
mother and also member of the KWP who lost her husband during the Korean
War but refused financial help from her rich siblings who wanted her life to be
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easier. One day, at a local party meeting, she publicly criticized the local school
principal’s wife. Mun called the principal’s wife ‘a human parasite’ because she
was not working and just stayed at home as a housewife. Kim Il Sung praised
Mun’s courage and stubbornness, abandoning selfishness and following the party
line, and gave Mun an honorary title as a true communist mother.
Criticizing a school principal’s wife publicly is notably unconventional in
Confucian ethics because, first of all, she is the respected headmaster’s wife and,
second, public condemnation is not appreciated no matter how wrong the accused
person’s misbehaviour is. What Kim Il Sung was trying to do was to impose what he
believed were communist ethics onto North Korean society. This was certainly not
the preferred measure that North Koreans would usually take. Public condemnation
or even in some cases public execution is still a working method implemented by the
DPRK regime. It is one of the regime’s most vicious policies, violating fundamental
and universal human rights and human dignity. Criticizing respected elders,
speaking of a ‘human parasite’, would not be acceptable to Confucians either.
On women’s duties, Kim Il Sung (1958/1981e, 543) explicitly said that women
should work so that society could have a larger female labour force. Women should
learn the socialist ideology that emphasizes labour being a ‘divine duty’. The right to
work is indeed one of the most important rights of all in the history of the evolution
of international human rights. Kim Il Sung described labour as women’s duty and
not a right, just as education was children’s duty not their right, as seen above.
North Korean women have multiple duties at home and at work. At home,
women are encouraged to be communist mothers who do take care of domestic
chores and childcare (men are never given this official and public duty to raise
children). Furthermore, all women who finish university education have a ‘legal’
duty to work for at least five years (Kim Il Sung 1961/1981c, 351–353). In reality,
women from rich family backgrounds do not work normally after college
graduation.10 Until 1961, North Korea had not produced any woman who held a
doctoral degree. Kim once publicly condemned women who thought staying at
home as a full-time housewife was better than becoming a full-time worker
(Kim Il Sung 1961/1981c, 351–353). For him, a woman who holds a university
degree only wishing to be a full-time housewife of a rich and powerful man was
utterly ‘bad’.
Emphasizing citizens’ duties had several purposes, as we have seen. Children’s
duties were aimed at imposing a collective mentality and selfless behaviour among
the younger generation. Women’s duties were used to mobilize the female labour
force. Both groups are internationally recognized as the neediest and most vulnerable
people, who need to have their rights protected by their respective governments. In
the DPRK, the government loads even more duties onto their shoulders. Rights to
education and work are translated into duties. Other Marxist states had a similar
conception about citizens’ duties before human rights, which consequently provided
a modern concept of citizen’s duties. However, what made this conception
acceptable in the DPRK was Korea’s deeply embedded Confucianism, which
focused extensively on the respective duties of each individual.
10 Interview with P00 on 6 November 2008, Kyunggi, South Korea.
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Conclusion
One element of North Korea’s multi-faceted rights thinking has been its Marxist
facade. The government has deliberately taken what it needed from Marx and other
Marxist states in forming the ideational constitution of human rights in North Korea
since 1945. As examined in this paper, the hostility to the capitalist notion of human
rights and the importance of the socio-economic structure for the protection of
human rights derive conventionally from Marx’s original views and the DPRK
government has borrowed class-based terms to repress the enemies of the proletariat
in North Korea. Other rights features, shared with Marxists states, include the
entitlement of rights contingent upon a person’s class status, the prioritization of
collective interests over individual rights, the primacy of subsistence rights over
other rights, and the priority of citizens’ duties over their rights. All of these Marxist
characteristics of human rights in the DPRK serve to provide the ideological ground
to mobilize national unity, the labour power for economic development, and loyalty
to the party’s leadership. More importantly, all these Marxist features in human
rights already existed in indigenous Korean philosophies, including Choson
Confucianism, that fed the growth of Korean-style Marxism in North Korea.
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